Going forward

THE Parliamentary Committee on National Security’s recommendations on the US-Pakistan relationship contain at least one major new and positive suggestion and at least one significant sticking point. Perhaps the most promising change Senator Rabbani laid out was not just tactical or strategic but philosophical, calling for greater transparency in the US-Pakistan relationship — a transparency overseen by the civilian set-up. On-paper agreements would replace the verbal understandings that have defined the terms of the relationship over the last decade. These would then go through the ministries concerned, including the law ministry, the PCNS, the cabinet and parliament. Slower progress would be an inevitable result, and the security establishment would still play a significant role behind the scenes. But if implemented, and defined in a manner that minimises red tape, this new framework could be a giant leap forward for transparency in the US-Pakistan relationship, the way the Pakistani public perceives the relationship and the strength of civilian institutions.

One particular recommendation does, however, have the potential to become a major roadblock. The PCNS called, more categorically than the parliamentary resolution passed after the Osama bin Laden raid, for an end to drone strikes. But if the terms of these strikes can be renegotiated to ensure that Pakistani sovereignty is not violated, and to minimise non-combatant casualties, it would be worth reconsidering. Drones reach areas the army cannot and cause fewer casualties than traditional air strikes. They have demonstrated their usefulness to Pakistan by taking out Baitullah Mehsud, then Pakistan’s public enemy number one. A more pragmatic approach would be to try to reach an agreement on the frequency of strikes — it would have to be brought down permanently from the pre-Salala level — and on sufficient Pakistani involvement in identifying targets and planning attacks. The risk of adopting the recommendations’ language and calling for an unqualified end to them in a parliamentary resolution is also that they may well continue despite these efforts, embarrassing the civilian set-up and further inflaming public opinion.

Most other demands, while asserting Pakistani sovereignty, have already been stated before or seem more doable. Calls for redrafting agreements on supply routes will come as no surprise here or in Washington. The apology on Salala could well come from the US military, if not from President Obama. Other issues might turn out to be more problematic, including the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline and greater transparency about potential American intelligence activities in Pakistan. In considering these, parliament will have to strike a tricky balance between looking out for Pakistan’s interests and preventing the dissolution of a critical relationship. Sovereignty is important, but Pakistan cannot afford not to be pragmatic.